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Abstract—Smart locks are a recent development in the
Internet of Things that aim to modernise traditional key-
based padlock systems. They allow users to operate the
lock with their smartphone instead of carrying around a
physical key. Typically, smart locks have a cloud system for
sharing access with other people, which makes them ideal
for schemes such as communal lockers or bike sharing. One
of the smart locks available on the market is that produced
by Master Lock. They are an established brand, and unlike
many of the single product companies that have provided
insecure offerings, Master Lock have so far shown that
their locks are reasonably secure and resistant to known
attacks such as shimming, fuzzing, and replay attacks. This
paper provides a security analysis of the Master Lock
Bluetooth padlock. More importantly, it reveals that there
were several security vulnerabilities, including a serious one
in the Application Programming Interface used by Master
Lock to provide a crucial feature for managing access. We
carried out a responsible disclosure exercise to Master Lock,
but communication proved to be quite a challenge. In the end
we managed to establish contact, and as a result the most
serious vulnerabilities have now been patched. This indicates
that responsible disclosure is a valuable exercise, but we still
need better report-and-response mechanisms.
Keywords: security, IoT, smart locks, API vulnerabilities,
responsible disclosure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are gaining popularity
and becoming more ubiquitous in our lives. There has
been a significant growth of IoT devices over the past
few years [1], but this new market has gained a reputation
for churning out insecure systems. This has led to security
and privacy concerns (such as [2]–[4]) and even a large-
scale Distributed Denial of Service attack using the Mirai
botnet of compromised IoT devices [5].
Smart locks provide a modern alternative to the traditional
key or combination lock, and access is generally managed
by an online service. Typically the locks themselves do
not connect to the internet directly, but communicate
with a smartphone app, which in turn talks to the online
service. This separation allows for locks to work offline,
an important feature if the owner is without an internet
connection or the online service becomes unavailable,
but also increases the attack space. The smartphone can
be thought of as the “key”, allowing its user to lock,
unlock and even share the smart lock with other users.
Furthermore, these locks typically provide an override
mechanism to allow their user to unlock it should the
associated smartphone become unavailable (e.g. due to the
smartphone being lost or stolen, or if the smartphone’s
battery has run out). In a sense, these override mechanisms
provide a way to open the lock with “something the user
knows”, akin to a combination lock or a password.
Locks have traditionally been judged on their physical
security; how well they stand up to picking, shimming and
cutting into. Smart locks need to be physically secure as
well as have a secure connection to a secure management
system. The market of smart locks is mostly made up of
small startup companies manufacturing a single product,
and many of them have been proven to be insecure (for ex-
ample [6] and [7]). The work presented in this paper looks
at the security of a smart lock built by an established lock
manufacturer (Master Lock, https://www.masterlock.com/)
to see if they have better security than other (relatively
new) companies.
The key contributions of this paper are: (i) a thorough
and systematic security analysis of the Master Lock Blue-
tooth padlock, leading to (ii) the revelation of several
vulnerabilities, including a serious security issue with the
Application Programming Interface (API) used, and (iii)
an impactful responsible disclosure exercise, which ended
up with the manufacturer of Master Lock patching their
system to address the vulnerabilities we uncovered.
Section II provides an overview of related work in investi-
gating security issues in smart locks. Section III introduces
the Master Lock Bluetooth padlock, including its system
and communication architecture. Section IV outlines our
methodology for finding potential security vulnerabilities
in Master Lock, along with an attacker model. Section V
presents and discusses the results of our investigation, as
well as our responsible disclosure. Section VI concludes
our paper and provides some ideas for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Limited prior research has been undertaken regarding the
security of smart locks. Nevertheless, there is a wide range
of potential attack vectors. These include physical attack,
wireless communication sniffing and spoofing, as well as
exploiting the supporting back end services that enable
many of the “smart” features of smart locks.
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There is a wealth of related work in IoT security, some
of which has informed our research here. An early paper
by Suo et al. [8] provides an overview of four key
layers of typical IoT architecture (perceptual, network,
support and application layers). Of particular interest to
us is the support layer, in which centralised control func-
tionality (such as access management) is implemented.
The challenge here is how to detect malicious activity,
such as commands that should not be executed due to
insufficient privileges, but may be performed anyway due
to improperly implemented access control.
Wurm et al. [9] performed security analyses on consumer
and industrial IoT devices. Some of the techniques used
(hardware and network communication analysis, reverse
engineering) gave us some initial direction when looking
at Master Lock’s offering.
We found that most of the investigation into breaking
smart lock security has come from hacking communities,
with scarce academic papers looking into the potential
security vulnerabilities of smart locks. One example of
the latter is a paper on the Noke¯ smart lock [10]. The
researchers focused on the manual override feature of the
Noke¯ lock and studied human-generated unlock codes.
They showed that the human-generated codes were of
low enough entropy to pose a serious vulnerability. A
mechanical brute-force tool was built to demonstrate this.
A DEF CON presentation on hacking Bluetooth locks [6]
specifically stated that two locks (from Noke¯ and Master
Lock) had not been cracked, showing that neither padlock
had trivially broken security. This provided a challenge
and a list of common attacks on smart locks to focus on:
• Plain-text passwords: Bluetooth transmission of pass-
words without encryption
• Replay attacks: where a recording of the communi-
cation can be replayed to unlock the device
• Fuzzing: sending invalid data can cause the device to
enter an error state and open
• Device spoofing: using a computer to pretend to be
the lock, we can listen to commands sent by a phone
and use them to unlock the real device
• Hard-coded secrets: some lock manufacturers include
hard-coded secrets in the smartphone application,
which can be retrieved by decompiling it
Another presentation from DEF CON included the full
methodology used to hack an August Smart Lock installed
in a front door [7]. This was of particular interest since the
methods used attacked both the Bluetooth communication
layer and the supporting cloud service, which is similar in
architecture to the Master Lock service. They looked at:
• Investigating the cloud service API: checking if users
can get privileged data or perform privileged actions
from a guest account
Figure 1. Master Lock and its override buttons
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Figure 2. Master Lock components and their communication
• Man-in-the-Middle: by hosting a service which sits
between the phone and the real cloud service, it is
possible to modify requests and responses
• Reading the firmware: downloading the firmware for
the device from the cloud service and looking for any
hard-coded secrets
Additionally, after mapping out the API, the author made
a Software Development Kit (SDK) for accessing the
API. This SDK made it easier for them to investigate the
methods provided by the API and to search for potential
vulnerabilities.
Master Lock have registered patents for the lock itself [11],
managing the authentication keys over wireless communi-
cation [12] and for wireless firmware updates [13]. This
indicated to us that Master Lock has put some effort into
designing these systems, and also gave us a starting point
for areas to investigate.
III. SYSTEM OF INTEREST: MASTER LOCK
We chose to focus on Master Lock as it is an established
brand specialising in various lock and padlock systems.
We had hoped that this industry experience would result
in a more secure system than their competitors.
A. System architecture
The Master Lock Bluetooth padlock is a Bluetooth enabled
padlock which comes in two form factors for indoor and
outdoor usage. It has the look and feel of an ordinary
padlock but instead of a keyway, it has a 4-directional pad
that serves as the input device for the override mechanism
(see Figure 1).
The overall Master Lock system has three key components
(Figure 2): the padlock, the smartphone application, and
the cloud service. These components communicate to each
other by using two protocols: Bluetooth Low Energy
(BLE) and HTTP, using the smartphone application as the
interlinking component.
The padlock has the Slave Role, and communicates with
the smartphone, which gets the Master Role [14, Vol 6,
Part B, Section 1.1, p. 2553]. This means that the padlock
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advertises itself when it turns on, on one of the three
advertising channels. The phone will periodically scan for
Bluetooth devices, and initiate a connection with the lock
when it is available.
The Master Lock Vault eLocks application runs as a ser-
vice in the background on the phone, and sends encrypted
commands to unlock the padlock when connected. It has
to query the cloud service to discover the locks which
the user has access to. In the application interface, a user
will either see the current valid temporary code if they
are a guest, or the primary code if they own the lock.
Furthermore, the owner is able to share future temporary
codes which they can request from the cloud service (see
Section III-C).
B. Unlocking the padlock
Before using the padlock, a user must install the Master
Lock Vault eLocks app on their phone. They can then
add the device to their Master Lock account by entering
the code which is printed on a sticker attached to the
packaging. This makes this user the owner of the padlock
and gives their account full access to control the device.
The Master Lock Bluetooth padlock has two methods to
unlock: using the smartphone eLocks app with Bluetooth
LE communication, or entering a combination on the
directional pad (the latter as an override mechanism).
To use a smartphone to unlock the padlock, the user can
simply press any direction on the directional pad while
the Master Lock Vault eLocks application is open. This
sometimes works when the application is not open, but
seems to be dependent on the smartphone keeping the
Bluetooth radio active.
To unlock manually, the user needs to enter a combination
on the directional pad on the front of the lock (which is
similar to a password). If the combination is correct, it will
unlock as soon as the last input is entered. Otherwise, the
device will continue listening to inputs for a few seconds
before the LED turns red, indicating an invalid code.
There are three different types of combination:
• Primary code (the owner of the device sets this)
• Backup Master code (the owner of the device knows
this, and it cannot be changed)
• Temporary code (used for time-limited guest or
shared access)
C. Sharing access
Sharing lock access is a big feature for smart locks, since
a selling point is that you can grant temporary access
without giving someone a key, and can revoke access at
any time. This means you do not have to trust the guest
to give the key back, and there’s no risk of them making
a physical copy.
To share the device with other users, one can either share a
temporary code for a specific time slot, or add a guest user
to the lock. When sharing a temporary code, the Master
Lock Vault eLocks application uses the default sharing
system of the smartphone’s operating system, so it can
share the code through any messaging app of the user’s
choice. Adding a guest user requires them to have a Master
Lock Vault account.
Temporary codes are valid for 8 hours, and are generated
every 4 hours at 12am, 4am, 8am, 12pm, 4pm, and 8pm.
This means that there are two valid temporary codes at any
time. The padlock does not have to be connected to the
smartphone app to know which temporary codes are valid,
but will fall out of sync if the battery is removed. When the
owner generates a temporary code, they can either choose
to get the current code, or a code valid at a specified time
in the future.
The owner can limit the guest’s access to day-time (7am-
7pm) or night-time (7pm-7am). The guest will only be
able to receive temporary codes during those hours, but
the validity of the codes is still the same. This means that
a guest with access limited to day-time will be able to
get the code generated at 4pm, which will be valid until
midnight. Similarly a guest with access at night-time will
be able to get the code generated at 4am, which will be
valid until midday.
IV. METHODOLOGY
When we started our research, we spent some time in-
vestigating traditional locks and methods of picking them.
While a “smart lock” does not have a keyway, it still has
many of the physical components of a traditional padlock,
meaning that it shares some of the same vulnerabilities.
Some padlocks made by startup companies suffer from
technical weaknesses, and some had poor build quality
or were not resistant to simple physical attacks [6]. When
we experimented with lock picking, we found that cheaper
Master Lock padlocks were very easy to pick—even for
novices. We theorised that vulnerabilities may translate to
their smart padlock security as well.
Others have carried out tests regarding the physical robust-
ness of the Master Lock Bluetooth padlock. For example,
[15] shows that striking the lock with a hammer can
cause it to fall apart. We are not interested to repeat this
investigation, so we looked at other ways to tamper with
the lock and gain illicit access.
This section outlines various methods we explored in order
to find security vulnerabilities in Master Lock. These tech-
niques are also generally applicable to other IoT devices,
and may serve as a template methodology for investigating
potential vulnerabilities in other IoT systems with a similar
architecture.
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• We looked at a possibility of physical tampering by
disrupting the power source to see if this would cause
inconsistency in the internal clock.
• We investigated the likelihood of a brute force attack
to guess the override pattern to unlock the padlock.
• We used a Bluetooth packet sniffer to investigate the
communication between the phone and the padlock.
• We decompiled the Android app to check for hard-
coded encryption keys and secrets, and to find out
how it communicated with the padlock and the cloud.
• We investigated the cloud service’s REST API to see
if we could extract information about a lock and its
owner.
A. RTC manipulation
The padlock has a Real-Time Clock (RTC) which it uses
to validate temporary codes. Based on information from a
teardown video [16], we saw that the padlock uses a Texas
Instruments MSP430 chip [17]. There is no other hardware
that could keep track of real time, so we conclude that the
padlock uses the RTC function on this chip.
There is only one power source in the padlock—the coin
cell battery. So the first thing we could do was to remove
the battery and see how that affected the operation of the
lock.
B. Brute-force attack
There are possible brute-force attacks based on the
directional-pad input. For example, it is possible to build a
rig to attach a mechanical brute-force device to the lock,
similar to the work presented by [10]. This brute-forcer
can be programmed to enter multitudes of codes to open
the lock using the manual override.
There are three types of code, each of different length,
with the temporary code always starting with right, while
the primary and master backup codes start with up.
When a human is inputting codes, it is possible to enter 3
codes in roughly 20 seconds, after which the device will
“lock-out” and not accept any more inputs for 60 seconds.
This time does not vary by much when entering different
length codes, as the majority of the time is spent waiting
for the directional pad to re-activate after each incorrect
code. This means that on average we can enter one code
every 26.7 seconds. It is possible that a rig would enter
codes faster than this, but this is adequate for a benchmark.
C. Bluetooth security
We briefly looked at the security of the Bluetooth com-
munication between the Master Lock and the smartphone
companion app. We recorded the communication between
the phone and the lock using Wireshark [18] and a
Bluetooth packet sniffer. Recording this was tricky because
the smartphone sometimes fails to detect the lock and
connect properly.
D. Application security
Master Lock have made apps for Android and iOS. We
tested the Android version1, as it is easier to decompile.
1) Temporary codes
We found that when sharing a temporary code, the inter-
face advertises that the codes will be valid for 4 hours.
However, the message generated to actually share the
code says it expires in 8 hours. This peculiar behaviour
showed that there was some amount of complexity in the
temporary code system, making it a good candidate for
vulnerabilities. To find out more about the generation of
temporary codes, we needed to know more about how the
application works.
2) Decompiling
The Android Package Kit (APK) of the app had not
been obfuscated, so decompiling produced mostly easy-to-
read Java source code. Apktool [19] was used to extract
metadata and the bytecode in DEX format. dex2jar [20]
converted the bytecode to JAR format, and JD-GUI [21]
decompiled this to source code.
Having access to the source code of the app allowed us
to look at the communication protocols between both the
padlock and the phone, and the phone and the server.
3) Dumping app data
With a rooted phone, we managed to dump the app’s
data store. In the shared preferences folder, we found the
file com.masterlock.ble.app.xml. This contains
two pieces of sensitive data: “authToken” and “dbToken”.
The “authToken” is used along with the username to
access the API. The “dbToken” is the password for an
encrypted database. We also found this same password in
the decompiled APK source code.
In the databases folder there is masterlock.db, an
SQLite database encrypted by SQLCipher [22]. Using the
“dbToken”, we decrypted the database and found that it
stores all of the data that the app uses. Looking at the
database access in the source code, it seems like most –
if not all – of this data is just cached API queries.
E. API security
The Android app uses the Retrofit library [23] for com-
municating with the server’s REST API. The API calls
all start with an explicit version number. Of the API calls
listed in the app source code, there are 44 v4 calls and
14 v5 calls. The app only communicates with the API
over HTTPS, however, the API itself is accessible over
plain HTTP when accessed through other means. This




in plaintext when HTTP is used instead of HTTPS. We
built a Python script to aid our testing, which is available
on Github2.
1) Generating an API key
In most of the requests with the API, the server authen-
ticates a user by both username and API key. If a user
does not already have an API key (this can be found in
the Android app’s shared preferences folder), the first call
they need to make is to “v4/account/authenticate/”. This
request requires an API key as parameter, but one can
use “androidble” or “iosble” in place of an actual key.
The body of the request is a JSON object containing the
username and password. This is the only API call that
requires a password – the API key is used like a password
in all other requests. Sample Python code for performing
this request can be seen below:
def get_api_key(username, password):
"""API call to get an API key to use in future requests."""
method = "POST"
url = BASE_URL + "v4/account/authenticate/"





response_json = call_api(method, url, parameters, body)
return response_json["Token"]
2) Getting padlock details
We have found one API call in particular that returns
a lot of information, from which we can extract some
interesting values:
def get_products(username, api_key):
"""API call to get a list of products registered with the account."""
method = "GET"





response_json = call_api(method, url, parameters)
products = []















This single API call gives us all the information about all
products registered to the account. Further API requests
about individual padlocks require the “KMS id”. We get
the GPS coordinates of the last known location of the
lock in this request, as well as the user-set primary code
that was discussed earlier. Even a guest user can get the
primary code using this API call, which should only be
accessible to the owner.
2https://github.com/Edward-Knight/master_lock_api
3) Generating temporary codes
The Android app does not contain the code to generate
temporary codes, so it has to ask the server to generate
them. Temporary codes can be generated for any time in
the future in 4 hour intervals. The latest code that can be
generated is in the year 9999, before the year rolls over
to 5 digits.
def generate_temporary_code(username, api_key, kms_id, access_time=None):
"""
API call to generate a temporary code. If access_time is None,
gets a currently active code.
"""
method = "GET"





if access_time is not None:
parameters["accessTime"] = access_time
response_json = call_api(method, url, parameters)
return response_json["ServiceCode"]
As with a lot of “KMS id” specific API calls, the account
username must be registered with the product. For this API
call, one can be registered as a guest with the padlock.
4) Sending password reset emails
Another API request of interest is to send password reset
emails. In the app, this is triggered when the user selects
“forgot password” when authenticating. There is a similar




API call that sends a password reset email to the specified address.
Returns True if successful and False otherwise.
Call this in a loop for a Denial of Service attack.
"""
method = "POST"




body = {"email": email}
try:
response_json = call_api(method, url, parameters, body)
return isinstance(response_json, dict) \
and "ServiceResult" in response_json \
and response_json["ServiceResult"] == 1
except MasterLockError:
return False
Of note is the fact that one does not need to be authenti-
cated to use this API call—they only need to supply the
user’s email address. If the email is recognised, Master
Lock will send an email to that address. Otherwise the
request will return an error code. This also means that
this method can be used to check if an email address is
associated with a Master Lock account.
F. Attacker model
There are a couple of potential scenarios where an attacker
may be able to compromise the security of a Master Lock
device:
• The simplest scenario of attack involves a guest user
exploiting the security vulnerability in the REST API
service to generate many temporary codes that will
be valid into the future. This means that the attacker
will still be able to unlock the padlock, even after
their access has been revoked.
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• For a potential attacker who has not been added as
a guest user of the lock, the likely scenario is for
them to carry out a brute-force attack on the override
mechanism using the 4-key directional pad.
As this kind of lock is typically used in sharing schemes,
the vulnerabilities uncovered through our research pose a
real threat to the security of anyone using Master Lock,
as discussed in the next section.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Using the techniques and approaches outlined in Section
IV, we gained valuable insights into how Master Lock
works, and we uncovered several security vulnerabilities
with varying levels of severity.
A. RTC manipulation result and discussion
We found that when the battery is removed, the RTC is
effectively “paused”, meaning it falls behind the real time.
When the battery is re-inserted, the RTC resumes from
where it left off. The RTC is corrected when it commu-
nicates with a phone again. Of course, this “correction”
process just uses the phone’s internal clock. After testing,
we discovered that the lock’s RTC is updated to whatever
the time on the phone is. This updating only happens when
communicating with the owner’s phone, not a guest’s.
We have managed to successfully exploit this behaviour
to get the padlock to validate expired temporary codes.
However, either the padlock has to be unlocked (in order
to access the battery compartment) or the attacker needs
to use the owner’s phone, so this is not a feasible attack.
B. Brute-force attack result and discussion
Sampling temporary codes from the API shows that they
all start with a right press – no other patterns were found.
Out of 11,910 temporary codes, the expected occurrence
of each direction (not including the initial right press) is
(11910∗7)/4 = 20842.5. Our statistical analysis (Table I)
shows that the temporary codes are uniformly distributed.
Brute-forcing the backup master code would be the most
valuable, as the user cannot change it. However it is also
the most complex, with an attack space of 410 codes (4
directions, code of length 11 but always starts with up).
This would take almost a year to attack, which is not
practical.
Brute-forcing the primary code has an attack space of 46
codes (4 directions, code length of 7 but starts with up).
This would take a maximum of 30 hours to brute-force,
which is much more reasonable.
Finally, brute-forcing the temporary codes has an attack
space of (47)/2 (4 directions, code length of 8 but starting
with right, but with two codes active at any time). This
would take a maximum of 60 hours, but is not feasible as
each temporary code is only valid for 8 hours.
C. Bluetooth sniffing result and discussion
Analysing the handshake between the lock and the phone,
we saw some information transmitted in plaintext (e.g. the
lock’s firmware version). After a handshake is completed,
the smartphone and padlock seem to move to encrypted
communication.
We continued investigating the Bluetooth security at a
low priority, as we had already seen that a wide-range
of attacks had already been attempted on the Master Lock
[6] without success. We have not found this aspect of the
system to be vulnerable, but a more detailed analysis is
required before we would be confident in calling it secure.
Details about the padlock which cannot be seen on the
device were communicated in plaintext, including the
firmware version.
D. Application and API dissecting result and discussion
Analysing the decompiled Android app, we were able to
find the REST interface for the cloud service and the
Bluetooth LE interface for the padlock. We also found the
encryption key used for application’s database, which we
used to decrypt a dumped database. This contained some
secrets about the lock, and some personal information.
We created a Python program to interact with the REST
API, which is able to authenticate with a username and
password and query the details for the account which the
padlock is registered to. Accounts with guest association
can access privileged information, such as the device
location and the primary code. Guests can also generate
temporary codes for times which should be restricted.
We have demonstrated the specific attacks outlined below.
1) Key invalidation and rate limiting
The API keys generated seem to never expire. This means
that leaking an API key is as bad as leaking the user’s
password. However, we found out that a password change
will invalidate the API keys.
In our testing, we also found that the server does not rate-
limit calls, or blacklist IP addresses. On its own, this is
not a security flaw, but it can be exploited in combination
with other flaws to make certain attacks viable.
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2) Guest access hours
Guests can be allowed to unlock the padlock at certain
time intervals. They can do this through Bluetooth LE
with their phone, or by a temporary code which rolls over
every 8 hours. The app therefore has to be able to perform
the “generate temporary code” API call with guest-level
credentials. However, the guest is only restricted to the
time when they can call the API. Because one can specify
the time a temporary code should be active for, it is
possible to generate temporary codes that can be used later.
This effectively means the entire “access hour” restriction
can be bypassed by pre-generating temporary codes far
into the future.
We created temporary access codes for one of our locks
that will be valid for a 10-year span from 2017-12-07 until
2027-12-05. A selection of these codes can be seen in
Appendix A. We tested these codes for the appropriate
time slots “in the future”, and they worked as expected.
What we did not expect was that the temporary codes were
still valid after the Master Lock device was unregistered
from the original owner and registered with a new owner.
We would have expected that this process would have
invalidated all future temporary codes, but our experiment
showed that they were still valid. This means that it is
possible for anyone who previously had guest access to
keep being able to unlock the device even after their access
is revoked, which is a serious vulnerability.
3) Guest access level
All padlock-specific API calls require the account to be
associated with the device in Master Lock’s system. This
association can be at two levels, “guest” and “owner”.
Some API calls will therefore return different data, or
not work at all, if the user is without proper association.
However, this is not correctly configured for “get product
details”. Even if one’s account only has guest access for
the padlock, this API call will return the primary code.
This is the owner-set directional code used to unlock the
padlock. Even if the owner revokes guest access and resets
their encryption keys, as suggested on the Master Lock
website3, the primary code will stay the same. As an
unusual password, the primary code is unlikely to ever
be changed by the owner, and likely to be the same on all
the locks they own.
E. Responsible disclosure
We carried out a responsible disclosure exercise by sub-
mitting our findings to Master Lock to give them time to
fix their systems before making the vulnerabilities public.
We found it challenging to find an appropriate method to
contact Master Lock. We tried the following recommended
methods to no avail:
3https://www.masterlock.com/bluetoothlockbox/guest-access
• The Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams
(FIRST) list4
• The Task Force on Computer Security Incident Re-
sponse Teams (TF-CSIRT) Trusted Introducer list5
• Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) CVE
Numbering Authorities (CNA) list6
• A security.txt file7
• HackerOne’s directory8
• Bugcrowd’s bug bounty list9
• RFC 2142 email addresses [24]
The only official contact methods we found were contact
forms on the main Master Lock website10 and on the
Master Lock Vault website11. As these were both customer
contact methods, we were not hopeful of our disclosure
document getting to the right place.
As a last resort, we managed to find the “Global Informa-
tion Security Manager” for Master Lock through LinkedIn.
We reached out to their personal email address to ask
for a work contact, stating our intentions. They replied
quickly (same day on 19 March 2018) and promised to
analyse our disclosure document, but we did not hear
anything further. While writing up this paper, we decided
to try contacting Master Lock again. This happened on
12–13 March 2019 and this time we got a much more
comprehensive response. They confirmed our findings, and
worked quickly to resolve the issues. As a result, several
key vulnerabilities have now been patched:
• The most serious vulnerability in the API (which
would allow a guest user to obtain the primary
code and future temporary codes) has been fixed, by
restricting guest access permissions
• Insecure HTTP access to their API has been disabled
• The API now uses a rate-limiting mechanism to
prevent an attacker from spamming email addresses
There are still some less severe vulnerabilities that need
to be addressed, but we feel confident that the company is
taking security seriously, and that they will fix the other
vulnerabilities in due course.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Previous research into smart lock security had found many
locks to be insecure, but did not show any technical
vulnerabilities in Master Lock’s offering. We applied
techniques from one researcher [7] which broaden the










several significant vulnerabilities with the Master Lock
Vault eLocks service.
We disclosed these vulnerabilities to Master Lock (initially
on 19 March 2018, with a follow up a year later). After
some initial difficulties in communication, we managed
to get a positive response from Master Lock, who ac-
knowledged our findings and moved quickly to implement
patches to secure the padlock’s ecosystem.
Future investigation could look closer at the Bluetooth
LE protocol used between the smartphone app and the
padlock. Other researchers seem to have found it not triv-
ially insecure, but a more in-depth analysis is required to
determine if there is any part of the communication which
is vulnerable. Capturing the padlock firmware during an
update would also be interesting. This can be analysed in a
similar way to the Android application to see if it contains
any hard-coded keys or secrets, or even to reverse-engineer
the algorithm for generating temporary codes.
A mechanical brute-forcer tool could be built to allow a
systematic approach to unlock the Master Lock by repeat-
edly guessing the override codes. This is an interesting
engineering challenge, and we believe the low entropy of
potential codes will make it feasible to find the correct
code in a relatively short time.
From a more generic point of view, many IoT systems rely
on back-end services to handle data and provide necessary
features. We have shown in this paper that these back-end
services can be the cause of serious vulnerabilities if they
are not secured properly. A holistic perspective has to be
taken with IoT security, requiring thorough examination
of the devices, supporting cloud services, and interlinking
components.
Finally, our experience in conducting a responsible dis-
closure exercise shows that it is a valuable process, but
we are still some way from having an effective means to
communicate our findings to device manufacturers.
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APPENDIX
A. Samples of Generated Temporary Codes
Using the Python script outlined in Section IV-E3, we
managed to create temporary access codes for one of our
Master Locks, for every 4-hour slot from 7 December 2017
until 5 December 2027. A small selection of the generated
temporary codes is provided below.
2017-12-07_00 RLLDLDRR
2017-12-07_04 RUDULLRR
2017-12-07_08 RRDDLLUL
2017-12-07_12 RRLLDRDL
2017-12-07_16 RRRRDUDU
2017-12-07_20 RURULLLR
2017-12-08_00 RRDDLRUU
2017-12-08_04 RDDLDLLR
2017-12-08_08 RDRLUUDL
2017-12-08_12 RURDURLD
2017-12-08_16 RUDRRULL
2017-12-08_20 RRDLUDRD
2017-12-09_00 RURLLDDR
2017-12-09_04 RULRDDDU
2017-12-09_08 RRLDLRLR
2017-12-09_12 RLULRURR
2017-12-09_16 RDLLDRLD
2017-12-09_20 RURDULDL
...
2019-03-15_00 RDRUUULL
2019-03-15_04 RLDULLUD
2019-03-15_08 RRRDLRUL
2019-03-15_12 RURRDLDU
2019-03-15_16 RUDLDLDR
2019-03-15_20 RRDURLLR
2019-03-16_00 RRLULRUR
2019-03-16_04 RLLURDRU
2019-03-16_08 RRLURRLD
2019-03-16_12 RULDUURL
2019-03-16_16 RULURLLU
2019-03-16_20 RRDUUDLU
2019-03-17_00 RDLDRRLL
2019-03-17_04 RDURUDRR
2019-03-17_08 RRRDULLR
2019-03-17_12 RDLUULUR
2019-03-17_16 RLUDDDUR
2019-03-17_20 RDDLULRL
...
2027-12-03_00 RUDLDDUL
2027-12-03_04 RRLLRDLL
2027-12-03_08 RRLDLRLR
2027-12-03_12 RRRRLRDU
2027-12-03_16 RRULURUD
2027-12-03_20 RRRURRRL
2027-12-04_00 RLDULUDD
2027-12-04_04 RURLDLLR
2027-12-04_08 RRLRLDLR
2027-12-04_12 RRRLUULR
2027-12-04_16 RDDDLDLD
2027-12-04_20 RDUUUULU
2027-12-05_00 RULRUUUD
2027-12-05_04 RLDURDLD
2027-12-05_08 RLULLDLL
2027-12-05_12 RUDUDDRD
2027-12-05_16 RDLRDDLU
2027-12-05_20 RRURDLDD
842
